

AIR WAR COLLEGE

AIR UNIVERSITY

SACRED VALUES, STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION,  
AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN AFGHANISTAN

*by*

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## **Biography**

Chaplain, Colonel Gary R. Califf USAFR is a student at Air War College, class of 2010, Air University, Maxwell AFB, Alabama. Air War College is the senior Air Force professional military school, and annually prepares more than 250 resident and over 5,000 nonresident senior students from all US military services, federal agencies, and 45 nations to lead in the strategic environment -- emphasizing the employment of air, space, and cyberspace in joint operations. Upon graduation he will earn a Master of Strategic Studies Degree and Joint Professional Military Education Phase II certification.

Prior to entering Air War College, Chaplain Califf served as IMA Staff Chaplain to the Deputy Command Chaplain, Headquarters Air Combat Command, Langley Air Force Base, Virginia. In this role, was responsible for overall presentation of Chaplain Service (CS) forces as required by all five geographic combatant commanders and their air components; trained as Functional Area Manager for all CS readiness activities; developed and managed all planning and execution activities to support all possible contingencies; ensured complete ministry support to warfighters; developed deployment training and managed readiness status of CS personnel; and, directed readiness preparedness. During this assignment, Ch Califf volunteered for two deployments: an 2007AEF deployment to SOUTHCOM as Installation Staff Chaplain, 478<sup>th</sup> EOS, Manta FOL, Ecuador; and, a 2008 JFCOM Operation Iraqi Freedom deployment as Senior Chaplain, Task Force Ramadi, Camp Ramadi, Iraq. Upon graduation, he will be assigned to Headquarters Air Force Reserve Command, Robins AFB, GA to serve as IMA to the Air Force Reserve Command Chaplain. Chaplain Califf is the Military Chaplain Associations winner of the 2008 AF Reserve Chaplain Distinguished Service Award.

Chaplain Califf was commissioned as a Second Lieutenant through the Chaplain Candidate Reserve Program in 1984 while attending Columbia Theological Seminary, Decatur, GA, and performed summer duty assignments at: Myrtle Beach AFB, SC; F. E. Warren AFB, WY; and McChord AFB, WA. In 1986, he earned the Doctor of Ministry degree and has served Presbyterian Church (USA) churches in Asheville, NC; Carmichael, CA; West Chester, OH; and, DuBois, PA. Corresponding IMA Chaplain attachments include: McClellan AFB, CA; Beale AFB, CA; USAF Academy, CO; and, HQ ACC, Langley AFB, VA.

Chaplain Califf's interest in the topic of values and how they drive individual and community behavior began during his years as a public school teacher and counselor teaching values clarification curriculum. His Doctorate in Ministry dissertation explored the dynamic role of normative stories, symbols, and rituals in forming community identities. He taught AF Core

Values to basic cadets in the Center for Character Formation at the US Air Force Academy, and has led mission efforts in Baja California and the Yucatán Peninsula, Mexico.

## Introduction

Fictional *Star Trek's* United Federation of Planets' Prime Directive guides Starfleet operations through 726 episodes and eight movies.<sup>1</sup> The doctrine dictates techno-socially advanced societies' non-interference in the development of primitive civilizations. Moral dilemmas and problematic dramas unfold when space-crew leadership beams into backward cultures, judges egregious desecration of universal values, and engages in corrective actions. Gene Roddenberry (1921-1991) scripted this 24<sup>th</sup> Century science fiction mandate consistent with 17<sup>th</sup> Century Westphalian principles of state sovereignty, which prohibits nation-states' interference in each other's internal affairs, no matter how well-intentioned.

Identifying nation-states as dysfunctional (failed, rogue, tyrannical, genocidal, etc.) and worthy of forcible change is very controversial and risky business. Legal and moral authority rests on effective strategic communication of United Nations (UN) internationally sanctioned end-states that align consistent ways and means of achievement. Interventions yield narratives that record dramatic stages of conflict over competing ideologies. Populations that adopt "necessary" changes hope to achieve the promise of better futures - both identities and cultures will be modified in the process.

The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) 2010 mission states the goal in Afghanistan: ... *to facilitate improvements in governance and socio-economic*

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<sup>1</sup> Giancarlo Genta, *Lonely Minds in the Universe: The Search for Extraterrestrial Intelligence*. (UK: Springer, 2007), p. 208. Articles of the Federation, United Federation of Planets: "As the right of each sentient species to live in accordance with its normal cultural evolution is considered sacred, no Starfleet personnel may interfere with the normal and healthy development of alien life and culture. Such interference includes introducing superior knowledge, strength, or technology to a world whose society is incapable of handling such advantages wisely. Starfleet personnel may not violate this Prime Directive, even to save their lives and/or their ship, unless they are acting to right an earlier violation or an accidental contamination of said culture. This directive takes precedence over any and all other considerations, and carries with it the highest moral obligation."

*development, in order to provide a secure environment for sustainable stability that is observable to the population.*<sup>2</sup> Efforts will instigate emotionally-laden struggles (*jihads*), over ideologies that will form new identities and impact culture. Countries involved will propagate value-sets that are alien to the history and culture of Afghanistan. *What moral authority trumps principles of non-interference, how are changes best accomplished, and why would Afghanis willingly cooperate?*

The thesis of this paper is that ISAF mission effectiveness requires clearly identifying and strategically communicating universally agreed upon sacred value themes. Afghani citizens must be actively engaged in creating narratives of struggle that demonstrate the value of appropriating the sacred values in governance and socioeconomic development. Because these sacred values reach into humanity's common spirit, they will draw on innate yearning to spur Afghanis to pursue these values. Afghanis will form new identities through population-focused operations that provide observed experiences of the sacred value themes, which will provide a secure, sustainable environment for stability.

This paper first defines sacred values and identifies five themes of overlapping consensus contained in UN agreements. These sacred value themes express innate human capacities that legitimate governments should provide and protect. Constitutional guarantees provide capabilities and ensure liberties to function as people choose. They provide criteria for crafting strategic communication through actions that form narratives and new identities in Afghanistan. The sacred value themes are: *pursuit of peace and*

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<sup>2</sup> NATO Web site. "International Security Assistance Force: Afghanistan, Mission." <http://www.isaf.nato.int/en/our-mission/> (accessed January 9, 2010). The entire mission statement is: ISAF, in support of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, conducts operations in Afghanistan to reduce the capability and will of the insurgency, support the growth in capacity and capability of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), and facilitate improvements in governance and socio-economic development, in order to provide a secure environment for sustainable stability that is observable to the population.

*security; justice and respect for rule of law; human rights for men and women(young and old); human dignity and worth; and, freedom of expression.* Next, the paper describes how strategic communication (SC) through information operations (IO) articulates sacred value themes by intentionally crafting actions that progress in six-chapter narratives of struggle by transforming sacred values into observable experiences. Sacred value themes provide ideological power that draws population participation and appropriation, forming new identities. Finally, the paper concludes with recommendations on optimizing sacred values in military operations in Afghanistan.

### **Sacred Values**

Two Marines firmly stand their ground and fire weapons at a red truck roaring toward their entry control point at a downtown Ramadi Iraqi Police station on April 22, 2008. The VBED (Vehicle Borne Explosive Device) explodes; the insurgent's shadowy silhouette behind the dusty windshield vanishes with the Marines in the blast. Lt Gen George J. Flynn, USMC, writes that these Marines are "*remarkable keepers of the flame,*" urging all Marines to embrace "... *the sense of obligation to the legacy that drives Marines... and help them carry the flame forward.*"<sup>3</sup> Self-sacrificial stories embody observed experiences of a value "worth dying for." Motivating the insurgent, perhaps, was the value: *freedom from infidel-occupiers*. How does ISAF identify and communicate criteria for judging between insurgent and counterinsurgent efforts?

*Definition:* Scott Atran and Robert Axelrod maintain: "Sacred values incorporate moral beliefs that drive human actions in ways that are dissociated from what one might view as rational prospects for instrumental or material success. These common human values are

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<sup>3</sup> Gen George Flynn, USMC. "Keepers of the Flame." *Joint Forces Quarterly* 54, 3rd Quarter 2009, 16-17. NOTE: The names of the Marines are: Cpl Jonathan T. Yale and LCpl Jordan Haerter.



timeless and enduring, guiding human thought and action across all cultural contexts. By definition, devotion to them ought to be absolute and inviolable.”<sup>4</sup> While instrumental values provide utility *to living*, sacred values encapsulate morality *in living*.

Martha Nussbaum identifies these types of values as universally discernable through innate capacities granted all human beings by virtue of birth.<sup>5</sup> Exercising such

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<sup>4</sup> Scott Atran and Robert Axelrod, "Reframing Sacred Values." *Negotiation Journal*, July 2008, 221.

<sup>5</sup> Martha Nussbaum, "In Defense of Universal Values." Lecture. Women and Human Development: The Fifth Annual Hesburgh Lectures on Ethics and Public Policy, The Joan B. Kroc Institute for International Studies, University of Notre Dame, February 1999. NOTE: Nussbaum distills a list of central human functional capacities (Nussbaum February 1999, 40-42), modernizing the principles for relevancy in today's world. She recognizes a timelessness for some items while acknowledging that human life exhibits a changing essence throughout history.

**Life.** Being able to live to the end of a human life of normal length; not dying prematurely, or before one's life is so reduced as to be not worth living.

**Bodily health.** Being able to have good health, including reproductive health; to be adequately nourished; to have adequate shelter.

**Bodily integrity.** Being able to move freely from place to place; having one's body boundaries treated as sovereign, i.e. being able to be secure against assault, including sexual assault, child sexual abuse, and domestic violence; having opportunities for sexual satisfaction and for choice in matters of reproduction.

**Senses, Imagination, and Thought.** Being able to use the senses, to imagine, think, and reason – and to do these things in a “truly human” way, a way informed and cultivated by an adequate education, including, but by no means limited to, literacy and basic mathematical and scientific training. Being able to use imagination and thought in connection with experiencing and producing self-expressive works and events of one's own choice, religious, literary, musical, and so forth. Being able to use one's mind in ways protected by guarantees of freedom of expression with respect to both political and artistic speech, and freedom of religious exercise. Being able to search for the ultimate meaning of life in one's own way. Being able to have pleasurable experiences, and to avoid non-necessary pain.

**Emotions.** Being able to have attachments to things and people outside ourselves; to love those who love and care for us, to grieve at their absence; in general, to love, to grieve, to experience longing, gratitude, and justified anger. Not having one's emotional development blighted by overwhelming fear and anxiety, or by traumatic events of abuse or neglect. (Supporting this capability means supporting forms of human association that can be shown to be crucial in their development.)

**Practical Reason.** Being able to form a conception of the good and to engage in critical reflection about the planning of one's life. (This entails protection for the liberty of conscience.)

**Affiliation.** A. Being able to live with and toward others, to recognize and show concern for other human beings, to engage in various forms of social interaction; to be able to imagine the situation of another and to have compassion for that situation; to have the capability for both justice and friendship. (Protecting this capability means protecting institutions that constitute and nourish such forms of affiliation and also protecting the freedom of assembly and political speech.) B. Having the social bases of self-respect and non-humiliation; being able to be treated as a dignified being whose worth is equal to that of others. This entails, at a minimum, protections against discrimination on the basis of race, sex, religion, caste, ethnicity, or national origin.

**Other Species.** Being able to live with concern for and in relation to animals, plants, and the world of nature.

**Play.** Being able to laugh, to play, and enjoy recreational activities.

**Control over one's Environment.** A. Political. Being able to participate effectively in political choices that govern one's life; having the right of political participation, protections of free speech and association. B.

**Material.** Being able to hold property (both land and movable goods), not just formally but in terms of real opportunity; and having property rights on an equal basis with others; having the right to seek employment on an equal basis with others; having the freedom from unwarranted search and seizure. In work, being able to work as

capacities requires physical resources and liberties to function. Merely possessing a capability does not mandate its exercise. But if liberty does not exist, there is no capability. For instance, Taliban interpretation of *sharia* law denied choice by mandating female wear of the *burka*. Afghani women provided liberty to choose, might possibly wear the *burka* voluntarily for religious or cultural reasons. Nussbaum maintains that people are innately drawn toward obtaining capabilities and liberties to choose how to function.

Legitimate governments provide capabilities and liberties to function by offering resources - security, laws, and services that permit people to exercise innate capacities. For example, eighteen miles from Kunduz in Char Dara, Afghans desire an education. Taliban prevent construction of schools “through kidnappings for ransom and protection payments from contractors.”<sup>6</sup> The Government of Afghanistan (GoIRA) cannot provide the needed security that permits construction to satisfy citizens’ desires to learn.<sup>7</sup> Therefore, observed experiences conclude that the GoIRA is illegitimate.

In sum, sacred values are universal, timeless, enduring moral beliefs that emerge from innate, human capacities. Such values are universal, “a basis for basic political principles that should underwrite constitutional guarantees.”<sup>8</sup> Legitimate governments support expression of sacred values, providing citizens capabilities with liberties to

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a human being, exercising practical reason and entering into meaningful relationships of mutual recognition with other workers.

<sup>6</sup> Aryn Baker, “How the Taliban Thrives,” *Time*, 7 September 2009, 49-50.

<sup>7</sup> Jan Garrett, *Martha Nussbaum on Capabilities and Human Rights*. 28 April 2008. <http://www.wku.edu/~jan.garrett/ethics/naussbaum.htm> (accessed 23 September 2009). NOTE: Garrett summarizes Martha Nussbaum on Capabilities and Human Rights: “Nussbaum offers a twofold intuition about human beings, on which she bases justice and human rights arguments that provide insight into how sacred values function in cooperative actions: “...namely, that all, just by being human, are of equal dignity and worth, no matter where they are situated in society, and that the primary source of this worth is a power of moral choice within them, a power that consists in the ability to plan a life in accordance with one’s own evaluation of ends.” The capabilities approach asks what people should be able to be and do in the country or culture in question, and what obstacles stand in the way.”

<sup>8</sup> Martha Nussbaum, “In Defense of Universal Values,” 33-34.

choose or not choose ways to function. People naturally seek capabilities to express sacred values by pursuing resources and liberties to function.

*International Agreements:* John Rawls in *Law of Peoples* refers to the existence of an “overlapping consensus” on human rights that reasonable people in most societies could agree upon.<sup>9</sup> Nation-states’ unanimity “gives reason to believe that we can justifiably argue that it should be honored by all peoples.”<sup>10</sup> The UN is the single global organization consisting of all recognized sovereign nation-states.<sup>11</sup> The following review of the UN Charter Preamble, International Bill of Universal Human Rights, 2000 UN Millennium Declaration, and the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document reveals five themes that fit this paper’s definition of sacred values: *pursuit of peace and security* – in all realms, individual to national, including ecologically; *justice and respect for rule of law; human rights for men and women, young and old* without regard to age, ethnicity, religion, culture, nationality (includes tolerance and acceptance of diversity); *human dignity and worth*; and, *freedom of expression* - (religion, political), social progress, and economic betterment.

The UN Charter Preamble summarizes fundamental human rights: “dignity and worth of the human person, equal rights of men and women, justice and respect for law, and social progress with improved standards of life with

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<sup>9</sup> Kimberly A. Hudson, *Justice, Intervention, and Force in International Relations*, (NY: Routledge: 2009), 70.

<sup>10</sup> Kimberly A. Hudson, *Justice, Intervention, and Force in International Relations*, 71.

<sup>11</sup> NOTE: Overlapping consensus will include other types of corporate bodies and peoples. Moderate adherents to the world’s great religions and philosophies generally agree on broad expressions of what they consider to be sacred and universal values. ISAF is predominantly led by the United States with the National Security Strategy (2006) that also identifies the hope that humanity will embrace its values of freedom, democracy, human rights, and free markets as universal.

larger freedoms.”<sup>12</sup> The International Bill of Universal Human Rights proclaims “a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations ...every individual and every organ of society..., to secure their universal and effective recognition and observances...”<sup>13</sup>

The 2000 UN Millennium Declaration reaffirmed values of “peace, prosperity, justice, and a collective responsibility to uphold human dignity, equality, and equity on a global scale,” stating that “these purposes and principles have proved timeless and universal, fundamental and essential: freedom, equality, solidarity, tolerance, respect for nature, and shared responsibility.”<sup>14</sup>

Signed by the heads-of-state of all the world’s nation-states, the unanimous acceptance of the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document reaffirms the UN’s identification and promotion of a defined set of values: “...respect for human rights and human dignity, freedom, equality, solidarity, tolerance, respect for nature, the rule of law, shared responsibility... universality and indivisibility of all human rights.”<sup>15</sup>

President Barack Obama summarized international acceptance of the UN’s identification of these themes, their universal applicability, and enduring nature:

Only a just peace based upon the inherent rights and dignity of every individual can truly be lasting.... It was this insight that drove drafters of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights ...they recognized that if human rights are not protected, peace is a hollow promise.... As the world grows smaller, you might think it would be easier for human beings to recognize how similar we are; to understand that we all basically want the same things; that we all hope for the chance to live out our lives with some measure of happiness and fulfillment for ourselves and our families....<sup>16</sup>

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<sup>12</sup> United Nations Document, *United Nations Charter*, 10 December 1948.

<sup>13</sup> United Nations Document, *International Bill of Human Rights*, 10 December 1948.

<sup>14</sup> United Nations Document, *Millennium Declaration I: Values and Principle*, 10 December 2000.

<sup>15</sup> United Nations Document, *High-Level Plenary Meeting of the General Assembly of September 2005: Values and Principles*, 16 September 2005.

<sup>16</sup> President Barack Obama, "Peace Requires Responsibility," Nobel Prize Acceptance Speech, 10 December 2009.

*Summary.* Sacred values are universal, timeless, enduring moral beliefs that identify innate, human capacities for which people naturally seek capabilities and liberties to function. As such, they provide the criteria for judging ISAF effectiveness in governance and socioeconomic improvements. Legitimate governments should provide and protect expression of sacred values, acting in accordance with human rights principles.<sup>17</sup> All recognized sovereign nation-states, speaking through UN agreements, consistently express five themes that fit this definition of sacred values: *pursuit of peace and security; justice and respect for rule of law; human rights for men and women (young and old); human dignity and worth; and, freedom of expression.*

Observed experiences of sacred values will draw on the innate human yearning common to all and will spur Afghans to their pursuit. However, for many reasons not all people will naturally respond. General David Petraeus testifies to the effectiveness of this approach, while admitting that “irreconcilables” will never cooperate.<sup>18</sup> In reference to the 2010 deployment of 30,000 U.S. troops to Afghanistan, he maintains that its citizens will welcome them “if we, indeed, are seen by the Afghan people to be helping

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<sup>17</sup> Army Doctrine, *FM 3-07 Stability Operations*, 6 October 2008, states: “A legitimate government acts in accordance with human rights laws and ensures that citizens have access to state resources in a fair and equitable manner. It respects the rights and freedoms reflected in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and abides by human rights treaties to which it is a party.”

<sup>18</sup> NOTE: John Rawls in *Political Liberalism* describes society’s common agreement on such principles as values as *overlapping consensus* and names those persons who are unwilling to accommodate to the overlapping consensus as *unreasonable people*. There are several reasons persons choose to oppose improvements in society: inability to comprehend or lack of experiences in their practice; desires to overthrow the system; objections to people working within the system; and, feeling that the overlapping consensus is incapable of solving the important problems. By this paper’s definition, sacred value themes represent overlapping consensus by the international community on the universal, innate, human capacities that legitimate governments protect and provide capabilities and liberties to function. Unreasonable people, are counterinsurgencies’ irreconcilables that will never enter into narratives that pursue and embrace new identities that lead to improvements in governance and socioeconomic development.

them realize a better future for themselves and their families.” He continued, saying that efforts to convince Taliban insurgents to make peace with the Afghan government were bearing fruit after in the Herat Province. Followers of a killed insurgent commander renounced violence and departed the insurgency. However, he cautioned, “Irreconcilables never will support the new Afghanistan, and must be killed, captured, or run off.”<sup>19</sup>

### **Strategic Communication (SC)**

*“People continue to make their identity through war. Hence, the shared experience and sacrifice of war is both a story and a celebration; and if war makes identity, then its ritual remembrance afterward is nothing less than a people’s mass. War is the liturgy of identity.”* Michael Vlahos<sup>20</sup>

Combatant commanders (COCOMs) require an unequivocal message that aligns effective words with demonstrable actions to produce desired effects.<sup>21</sup> Ambassador Crocker points to the critical need for effective synchronization of effective SC during war through integrating effective IO in all operations, admitting, “The first one on the scene tells the story, and wins the battle for the hearts and minds of the people.”<sup>22</sup> JP 3-13, *Information Operations*, states: “Strategic communication constitutes focused USG efforts to understand and engage key audiences in order to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable for the advancement of USG interests, policies, and objectives

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<sup>19</sup> United States Central Command Web site, Gerry Gilmore Gerry, “Petraeus: Afghan ‘Surge’ Will Target Terror Leaders,” 2 December 2009, accessed 5 February 2010.

<sup>20</sup> Michael Vlahos, *Fighting Identity: Sacred War and World Change*, in the series: *The Changing Face of War*, James Jay Carafano, (Westport, Connecticut: 2009), 30.

<sup>21</sup> Stephen P Perkins and Gary T. Scott, “Enabling Strategic Communication at the Combatant Commands,” *IO Sphere*, (Joint Operations Center: Spring 2006).

<sup>22</sup> Ryan Crocker, Ambassador to Iraq, Lecture., Air War College, Maxwell AFB, AL, 11 November 2009.

though the use of coordinated programs, plans, themes, messages, and products synchronized with the actions of all elements of power.”<sup>23</sup>

The most critical SC operating principle is centralized control of the message and decentralized execution of mission-type orders<sup>24</sup> to produce the desired effect on a population’s perceptions, attitudes, and beliefs. JP 3-13 warns that “uncoordinated IO can compromise, complicate, negate, or harm other JFC [Joint Force Commander] military operations, as well as other USG information activities.”<sup>25</sup> For example, Taliban militants in the Kunduz province of northern Afghanistan hijacked two oil tankers on September 4, 2009. While distributing fuel to civilians, NATO launched an airstrike that killed ninety people and incinerated the trucks.<sup>26</sup> Unfortunately, the Taliban fared better in their interpretation of events by spreading the story of NATO killing innocent peasants desperate for fuel and the self-proclaimed righteousness of the Taliban attempt to provide for people’s needs.

For this reason, “IO planning must begin at the **earliest stage** [sic] of a JFC’s campaign or operations planning and must be an integral part of, not an addition to, the overall planning effort. IO is used in all phases of a campaign or operation.”<sup>27</sup> SC unity of message and effort is achieved through psychological operations (PSYOP) with three supporting IO capabilities: Public Affairs (PA), Civil Military Operations (CMO) and Defense Support to Public Diplomacy (DSPD).<sup>28</sup> Synchronized, they craft perceptions,

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<sup>23</sup> Joint Publication (JP) 3-13. *Information Operations*. 13 February 2006, Chapter 1: Strategic Communications.

<sup>24</sup> Stephen P Perkins and Gary T. Scott, "Enabling Strategic Communication at the Combatant Commands."

<sup>25</sup> Joint Publication (JP) 3-13. *Information Operations*. 13 February 2006, Chapter 1: Strategic Communications.

<sup>26</sup> James Wray, "Afghanistan NATO Airstrike on Tankers." Monsters and Critics.com., WotR Ltd.

<sup>27</sup> Joint Publication (JP) 3-13. *Information Operations*. 13 February 2006.

<sup>28</sup> Joint Publication (JP) 3-13 *Information Operations* describes the three supporting capabilities: PSYOPs are designed for “planned operations to convey selected truthful information and indicators to foreign

interpret actions, and articulate meaning and purpose “to show that the cause and the situation of the counterinsurgent are better than the insurgent’s” and “demonstrate that siding with the enemy produces undesirable consequences.”<sup>29</sup>

Effective SC requires in-depth understanding Afghanistan and how sacred value themes are effectively deployed in the culture. The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) states “in counterinsurgencies and stability operations... population and stakeholder beliefs and perceptions are crucial to our success.”<sup>30</sup> Appropriating this principle, ISAF must develop thorough understandings “of the direct and indirect effects of potential actions and signals on perceptions, attitudes, and beliefs” to formulate “culturally attuned messages.”<sup>31</sup>

*Afghanistan:* The current Afghani strategic and operational context is:

“...still in the 14<sup>th</sup> Century. It is the fifth poorest nation on earth. Basic services are rudimentary or non-existent. The Afghans lack infrastructure, justice, resources, and the most basic forms of local and national governance... 70% of the country is illiterate... The lot of women is dismal... 87% complain of violence... half of it is sexual. General life expectancy is under 45 years... Tuberculosis and drug addiction are widespread. The country is infested with 5-7 million land mines which have disabled more than 200,000 Afghans.... Terrorism and lack of basic physical security is widespread. The Taliban enforce a parallel system of justice involving hangings, torture, and beheadings. Criminality and

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audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately, the behavior of their governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. ... to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator’s objectives.” PA is the “public information, command information, and community relations activities directed toward both the external and internal publics with interest in the Department of Defense.” CMO states: “the activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, governmental and nongovernmental civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace... to support US national security objectives. ...to facilitate military operations and achieve US objectives.” DSPD includes “those overt international information activities of the USG designed to promote US foreign policy objectives by seeking to understand, inform, and influence foreign audiences and opinion makers and by broadening the dialogue between American citizens and institutions and their counterparts abroad.”

<sup>29</sup> David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice*. (CT: Praeger Security International, 2006), 54.

<sup>30</sup> Department of Defense Document, *2010 Quadrennial Defense Review*, February 2008.

<sup>31</sup> Department of Defense Document, *2010 Quadrennial Defense Review*.



distortion on the nation's road network is omnipresent. Decades of warfare have left property issues in great disorder.”<sup>32</sup>

When judged in light of sacred value themes, the Taliban government was illegitimate by virtue of denying innate capacities and failing to provide capabilities with liberties to function.<sup>33</sup> Nonetheless, their forced removal has contributed to what experienced Air Force colonel, an international medicine and health specialist, refers to as the “unraveling of Afghani cultural identity.” Eighty-percent of Afghans live in rural areas and rely on word of mouth.<sup>34</sup> As a result, countless tribes and several ethnic groups live within a culture rich in the oral transmission of histories and traditions. Maiwand, an Afghan ISAF special forces interpreter, humorously explains, “If you want to get the word out, *tele-phone, tele-vision, tel-an-Afghan*.”<sup>35</sup> As occurred in prior British and Soviet Union military efforts, ISAF actions will become the stories that enter into oral narratives that will demonstrate ISAF identity. Earning the populace's active participation in governmental and socioeconomic improvements will require cogent SC through formative IO to create positive narratives that form new identities.

Gen McChrystal describes the demand for this deeds-based information environment where “...perceptions derive from actions, such as how we interact with the population and how quickly things change. The key to changing perceptions is changing

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<sup>32</sup> Gen (ret) Barry R McCaffrey, *After Action Report: Visit to Kuwait and Afghanistan 10-18 November 2008*, Strategic and Operational Assessment of Security Operations in Afghanistan, 5 December 2009.

<sup>33</sup> United Nations Document, *Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court*, 1 July 2002, would term many Taliban practices as illegal and inhumane (persecution, torture, extrajudicial execution, etc.). This international agreement claims that “all peoples are united by common bonds, their cultures pieced together in a common heritage.” Universal values are identified through abuses on populations, focusing on the “victims of unimaginable atrocities that deeply shock the conscience of humanity.” Article 6 defines genocide as “acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group.” Article 7 defines crimes against humanity “as murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, imprisonment in violation of laws, torture, sexual crimes, persecution against any identifiable group, enforced disappearance of persons, apartheid, and other acts causing great suffering or injury to mental or physical health.

<sup>34</sup> Gen Stanley A. McChrystal, *Initial United States Forces - Afghanistan (USFOR-A) Assessment*, COMISAF's Initial Assessment, Kabul, Afghanistan: Headquarters, International Security Assistance Force, 30 August 2009.

<sup>35</sup> Maiwand, interview, Air War College, 9 December 2009.

the underlying truths.”<sup>36</sup> Stories of disrespect by occupiers spread quickly, forming a narrative in the Afghani corporate memory of invading armies breaking down doors, entering homes forcefully, grabbing females. Ritually retold by Taliban, stories reveal “occupier” values and identify ISAF in observed experiences. Maiwand warns, “This is not right, not what Americans stand for as I see it. But this is what my people see. And the Taliban love it. It makes their job easy.”<sup>37</sup>

“Al Qa’da [AQ] is highly skilled at exploiting multiple, diverse actions by individuals and groups, framing them in a propaganda narrative to manipulate local and global audiences.<sup>38</sup> This propaganda capability...is central to the *takfiri*<sup>39</sup> objective of creating and manipulating local allies and portraying itself as ...vanguard of the resistance.”<sup>40</sup> As one of the poorest and most wretched places in the world, it is no surprise that both the Taliban and AQ thrived and offered their own radical interpretations of the Islamic beliefs that were readily accepted by an illiterate population.<sup>41</sup> Miawand explains, “We are Islam [sic] and always will be. But what is

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<sup>36</sup> Gen Stanley A. McChrystal, *Initial United States Forces – Afghanistan (USFOR-A) Assessment*, 1-2.

<sup>37</sup> Miawand, interview.

<sup>38</sup> David Kilcullen, *The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One*, (NY: Oxford University Press, 2009), xviii.

<sup>39</sup> David Kilcullen, *The Accidental Guerrilla*, xviii-xix, uses the term “*takfiri*” to describe the enemy’s ideology... the doctrine of *takfir* disobeys the Qur’anic injunction against compulsion in religion (Surah al-Bazarah: 256) and instead holds that Muslims whose beliefs differ from the *takfiri*’s are infidels who must be killed. Takfirism is a heresy within Islam: it was outlawed in the 2005 *Amman Message*, an initiative of King Abdullah II of Jordan, which brought together more than 500 *‘ulema* (Islamic scholars) and Muslim political leaders from the Organization of the Islamic Conference and the Arab League in a unprecedented consensus agreement, a “unanimous agreement by all Muslims everywhere as represented by their acknowledged most senior religious authorities and political leaders.” Al Qa’ida is *takfiri*, and its members are universally so described by other Muslims, whom they routinely terrorize. „,“takfirism” best describes the ideology currently threatening the Islamic world. I prefer it to the terms *jihad*, *jihadist*, *jihadi*, or *mujahidim* (literally “holy war” or “holy warrior”) which cede to the enemy the sacred status they crave, and to *irhabi* (terrorist) or *hiraba* (terrorism), which address AQ’s violence but not it’s ideology. *Takfiri* is also preferable to the terms *salafi* or *salafist*, which refer to the belief that the true Muslims should live like the first four generations of Muslims, the “pious ancestors” (*as-salaf as-aslih*). Most extremists are *alafi*, but few *salafi* believers are *takfiri*, and even fewer are terrorists: most, although fundamentalist conservatives, have no direct association with terrorism.

<sup>40</sup> David Kilcullen, *The Accidental Guerrilla*, 298.

<sup>41</sup> Martin Ewans, *Afghanistan: A Short History of Its People and Politics*, (NY: HarperCollins Publishers, Inc.: 2002), 11.

that? My people only know what this means by what they are told by elders and the mullahs.”<sup>42</sup>

For Afghans, little national awareness exists; local applications of Islam feature prominently in narratives that form identity. “Despite the bonds of Islam, a sense of national unity has thus always been weak, except when an unusually strong leader has appeared or the nation has come together when threatened by an external enemy... Rarely have the Afghans allowed themselves, or allowed others with whom they have come into contact to live out their lives in peace.”<sup>43</sup> Miawand explains how religious-cultural bias colors perceptions, “Two men sitting on a bench in the public market saw an ‘inappropriately dressed’ woman walk past. One criticized, ‘See, that’s how the West wants to change us!’”<sup>44</sup>

Interpretation also occurs in a cultural milieu highly sensitive to sacred codes of conflict over honor prevalent in most Eastern-Oriental societies.<sup>45</sup> Passionately, the young interpreter maintains, “Kill an Afghan and people will eventually forgive you.

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<sup>42</sup> Miawand, interview.

<sup>43</sup> Martin Ewans, *Afghanistan: A Short History of Its People and Politics*.

<sup>44</sup> Miawand, interview.

<sup>45</sup> Al Jazeera Web site. “Civil War: Obama's Gift to Pakistan,” (accessed 9 January 2009) describes the Pashtun- Pashtunwali code: “...the Pashtuns of Afghanistan cannot be separated from the Pashtuns of Pakistan across the Durand Line— a more than 1600 miles long border that ineffectively separates Afghanistan from Pakistan. Nearly 41 million Pashtuns live on both sides of the border; around 13 million in Afghanistan and twice as many (28 millions) in Pakistan. Concentrated in geographically contiguous regions of Afghanistan and Pakistan, the Pashtuns live in big cities, small towns, and remote villages. Kabul, Kandahar, Peshawar, Swat, and Quetta are their big cities. Going back thousands of years, the Pashtuns are united through culture, dialects, and traditions. Most have embraced the Sunni sect of Islam. Like other cultural groups, however, the Pashtuns have fused Islamic laws with their pre-Islamic honor code, known as the Pashtunwali. Pashtunwali is the unwritten Pashtun Code that regulates social behavior and interactions with foreigners. This Code belongs to the Pashtuns, not just to the Taliban. Hospitable and gracious, the Pashtuns go out of their way to respect and protect guests and strangers. Invaders, however, are killed without mercy. Nang (honor) is the founding principle of the Pashtun Code. Khushal Khan Khattak (1613-1689), a Pashtun warrior and a poet, summed up the nang principle in decisive words: “Death is better than life when life cannot be lived with honor.” Badal (revenge) is the integral part of honor. Badal requires that insult be avenged with insult, death with death, and no price is too high to seek revenge. Until the revenge is taken, the Pashtuns are restless, anxious, and uncomfortable with themselves. Forgiveness is available if the injury were unintentional. No forgiveness is rendered to invaders and occupiers. No enemy is too strong to deserve any exception to the Pashtun Code. Brits, Sikhs, Moguls, Russians, and Americans, whoever violates the Pashtun Code faces an unremitting resistance until badal has been consummated. Mighty armies have perished in the land of Pashtuns.”

Disrespect his family or tribe and *he will never forgive you.*<sup>46</sup> Miawand also confirms Afghan identity formed by centuries of tribal conflict and invading armies, laughing, “We are Afghan. Of course, we fight. That is what we do and who we are.”<sup>47</sup>

In sum, Afghan identities formed by the Taliban government betrayed sacred values themes. Their narrative recites stories of abusive. ISAF’s victory and resulting “unraveling of Afghani cultural identity” provides challenges and opportunities to create new narratives that form new identities based on sacred value themes. Afghanistan’s information environment is bias-rich, shared through oral traditions recording conflicts that are remembered through localized, illiterate interpretations of Islam. Key influencers and decision makers live within a context filled with tribal codes of honor. SC must appreciate this specific context within which ISAF actions will be observed and experienced. Therefore, the unfolding narrative requires a clear, unambiguous message that demonstrates the value of struggling to incorporate sacred value themes into a new narrative to improve governance and socioeconomic development.

*Identify Formation:* Michael Vlahos “...maintains that the process of globalization ushered into human consciousness a crisis of human change” in which both state and nonstate actors narrate a story where “people are seeking new meaning and new belonging.”<sup>48</sup> He observes that populations “pushed to the margins seek ways to survive, a path to realization.”<sup>49</sup> President Obama agreed: “...given the dizzying pace of globalization, and the cultural leveling of modernity, it should come as no surprise that people fear the loss of what they cherish about their particular identities -- their race, their

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<sup>46</sup> Miawand, interview.

<sup>47</sup> Miawand, interview.

<sup>48</sup> Michael Vlahos, *Fighting Identity: Sacred War and World Change*, 15.

<sup>49</sup> Michael Vlahos, *Fighting Identity: Sacred War and World Change*, 16.

tribe, and perhaps most powerfully their religion.”<sup>50</sup> Therefore, humanity’s big movement is not about wealth and poverty, it is about identity.<sup>51</sup>

FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*, acknowledges: “Narratives are central to representing identity, particularly the collective identity of religious sects, ethnic groupings, and tribal elements. Stories about a community’s history provide models of how actions and consequences are linked. Stories are often the basis for strategies and actions, as well as for interpreting others’ intentions.”<sup>52</sup> A senior military leader explained to the Air War College 2010 Class that to be successful in Afghanistan, military operations must work their way *into the narratives of the people to create acceptable identities that contribute to global peace and security.*

Clausewitz recognized war as politics by other means - a struggle of national wills. Nonstate actors also provide contexts for the clash of political will. Conflict provides stories, symbols, and rituals that create narratives and form identity. Vlahos states that “war gives new stories of collective passage their promise and power.”<sup>53</sup> Narratives forming identities unfold in six chapters that ISAF must utilize:

1. An unequivocal *commitment* to the stakes required to reach a transcendent goal;
2. A demand for *sacrifice* with assurances of infinite rewards;
3. A *call* by leadership to collective resistance against opposition;
4. An heroic *fight-battle* sequence;
5. A valiant *defense* of the homeland; and,
6. A collective pilgrimage to *consummate* the final goal and confirm identity.<sup>54</sup>

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<sup>50</sup> President Barach Obama, "Peace Requires Responsibility."

<sup>51</sup> Michael Vlahos, *Fighting Identity: Sacred War and World Change*, 11.

<sup>52</sup> Army Doctrine, *FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency*, 15 December 2006, 1-14.

<sup>53</sup> Michael Vlahos, *Fighting Identity: Sacred War and World Change*, 24.

<sup>54</sup> Michael Vlahos, *Fighting Identity: Sacred War and World Change*, 16.

Kilcullen contends that AQ has provoked Western powers into narratives with a series of protracted and exhausting wars to validate their identity.<sup>55</sup> Such a narrative of struggle (*jihad*), entangles both antagonists and perpetuates an “accidental guerrilla syndrome”<sup>56</sup> where populations become co-opted unwittingly. The extremists are utilizing a four-stage process:

1. *Identify* a societal problem;
2. *Spread* instability through terror that opposes it;
3. *Provoke* interventions that solidify the cause and exacerbate more violence; and,
4. Further *alienate* people and *strengthen* the terrorists.<sup>57</sup>

In sum, conflicts and struggles provide vital contexts for creating narratives that form identities. They typically unfold in six chapters. The Taliban and AQ are utilizing a four-step narrative process that validates their identity. FM 3-07, *Stability Operations*, states that one of the five overarching requirements for successful counterinsurgencies (COIN) is “IO aggressively employed to accomplish the following: favorably influence perceptions of host nation (HN) legitimacy and capabilities; obtain local, regional, and international support for COIN operations; publicize insurgent violence; and, discredit insurgent information operations and provide a more compelling alternative to the insurgent ideology and narrative.”<sup>58</sup> ISAF must effectively recognize and appropriate war’s context and intentionally create narratives that form new identities in the pursuit of an ideology that will appeal to the population.

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<sup>55</sup> David Kilcullen, *The Accidental Guerrilla*, 264.

<sup>56</sup> David Kilcullen, *The Accidental Guerrilla*.

<sup>57</sup> David Kilcullen, *The Accidental Guerrilla*.

<sup>58</sup> Army Doctrine, *FM 3-07 Stability Operations*, 6 October 2008, 5-1, 5-2.

*Ideological power of a cause:* Galula warns, “It has been asserted that a counterinsurgent confronted by a dynamic insurgent ideology is bound to meet defeat; that no amount of tactics and technique can compensate for his ideological handicap.”<sup>59</sup> FM 3-24,

*Counterinsurgency*, states:

The movement’s ideology explains its followers’ difficulties and provides a means to remedy those ills. The most powerful ideologies tap latent, emotional concerns of the populace. Examples of these concerns include religiously based objectives, a desire for justice, ethnic aspirations, and a goal of liberation from foreign occupation. Ideology provides a prism, including a vocabulary and analytical categories, through which followers perceive their situation.<sup>60</sup>

Insurgent Taliban and AQ have appropriated radical Islamic ideology to support their cause.<sup>61</sup> This very powerful asset for narrative and identity formation joined with Afghani warring propensities as motivation for abuse. “The irony is that... a fiercely independent people have been more determined than almost any other to resist outside interference... suffered from a regime whose human rights record was by any standards appalling. Too bigoted and incompetent to provide for even the most basic needs of its citizens...”<sup>62</sup>

ISAF mission success will be measured in constructing a narrative that clearly articulates an alternative ideology with a more compelling vision of the future than the

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<sup>59</sup> David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice*, 8.

<sup>60</sup> Army Doctrine. *FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency*. 15 December 2006, 1-14.

<sup>61</sup> Seth G. Jones, “The Rise of Afghanistan’s Insurgency: State Failure and Jihad,” (*International Security* 32, no. 4, Spring 2008), 27, describes the three main groups operate in Afghanistan that express similar Islamic-based radical fundamentalism: the Taliban, al-Qaida, and Hizb-i-Islami. The Taliban, the largest group, is motivated by a radical interpretation of Sunni Islam derived from Deobandism which is “a conservative Islamic orthodoxy that follows a Salafist egalitarian model and seeks to emulate the life and times of the Prophet Mohammed... It holds that a Muslim’s primary obligation and principal loyalty are to his religion. Deobands believe they have a sacred right and obligation to wage jihad to protect the Muslims of any country.” (Jones Vol. 32, No. 4, Spring 2008) Their extremist ideology links up with AQI and Osama bin Laden whose motivations are a more extreme version of Sunni thought, desiring “grandiose visions of spreading it to the Middle East.” (Jones Vol. 32, No. 4, Spring 2008, 28) AQI maintains anything non-Islamic was evil and claims that by drifting away from true Islam, many regimes in the ME should be overthrown. Jihad is a battle to institute the true, perfected religion where all power and authority belong to God who alone makes laws for humans to follow. (Jones Vol. 32, No. 4, Spring 2008) Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and the leadership of Hizb-i-Islami possess a similar ideology. Built on the Ikhwan model of Islamic revolution, it stresses the establishment of a pure Islamic state and, in the case of Hizb-i-Islami, was tied to a highly discipline organizational structure built around a small cadre of educated elites. After the overthrow of the Taliban regime, Hekmatyar openly pledged to cooperate with al-Qaida and Taliban forces out of Pakistan to fight occupying forces, called “crusader forces.”

<sup>62</sup> Martin Ewans, *Afghanistan: A Short History of Its People and Politics*, 297.

insurgents' vision.<sup>63</sup> "The central mechanism through which ideologies are expressed and absorbed is the narrative. A narrative is an organizational scheme expressed in story form."<sup>64</sup> SC must offer a clearly articulated, observed, and experienced ideology in narrative form within the population. Tapping into the inherent power of a vibrant ideology rooted in sacred values through consistent melding of word and action will reach into the very soul of humanity to draw people into the narrative that forms new identities. For this very reason, Gen McChrystal asserts that the objective for military operations in Afghanistan is the population and not the enemy.<sup>65</sup>

*Population-focused Objective.* Galula states, "The truth is that the insurgent, with his organization at the grass roots, is tactically the strongest of opponents where it counts, at the population level."<sup>66</sup> Population support of ideology infused with sacred value themes will be earned through observed, experienced actions injected into narratives that form new identity. This is accomplished in three ways:

First, gaining a population's active support is action-based by ensuring peace and security – the most critical sacred value theme. Galula states that "...emerging counterinsurgent supporters will not be able to rally the bulk of the population so long as the population is not convinced that the counterinsurgent has the will, the means, and the ability to win. When a man's life is at stake, it takes more than information operations to

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<sup>63</sup> Speaking for the lead ISAF nation, President Barack Obama in the "Afghanistan Strategy" speech to the nation at the US Military Academy at West Point, NY, on 3 December 2009, identified sacred values and their inherent moral power for identity formation in aligning words and actions: "We must draw on *the strength of our values*—for the challenges we may face have changed, but the things that we believe in must not. That is why we must *promote our values by living them* at home—which is why I have prohibited torture and will close the prison at Guantanamo Bay. And we must make it clear to every man, woman, and child around the world who lives under the dark cloud of tyranny that *America will speak out on behalf of their human rights, and tend to the light of freedom, and justice, and opportunity, and respect for the dignity of all peoples. That is who we are.* That is the source—the moral source of America's authority."

<sup>64</sup> Army Doctrine. *FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency*.

<sup>65</sup> Gen Stanley A. McChrystal, *Initial United States Forces – Afghanistan (USFOR-A) Assessment*.

<sup>66</sup> David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice*, 52.



budge him.”<sup>67</sup> Gen McChystal admitted, “It is our responsibility... to provide a secure environment for [Afghanis] to work. And so far, we have not done so.”<sup>68</sup> Insurgents instigate terror and stifle GoIRA efforts to earn legitimacy by threats, murder, and destruction.

Second, ISAF must demonstrate through observable, experienced actions that a society built on sacred values themes offers the best vision for the future. Citizens must be engaged in participatory stories that legitimate governmental efforts to provide populations with capabilities and liberties for functioning that are aligned with sacred values. Third, a population’s support evolves in an atmosphere of close proximity between the population and insurgents. Observed, experienced actions arise only from “deploying units where people actually live, play, and work.”<sup>69</sup> Insurgents plan for long durations, exposing lack of commitment and will of the opposition.<sup>70</sup> ISAF will earn trust through large concentrations of sustained, intense efforts over extended time periods.

In sum, concrete actions demonstrate effective peace and security that unfold into the population’s perception of viable and desirable visions of the future founded in sacred values. Visible commitments of ample resources experienced consistently over time will establish trusting relationships, provide essential stories that create deed-based narratives, reveal ISAF ideology, and form new identities.

*Summary.* The “unraveling of Afghani cultural identity” necessitates the intentional creation of new narratives and formation of new Afghani identities. ISAF mission accomplishment *to improve governance and socioeconomic development* will succeed

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<sup>67</sup> David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice*, 54-55.

<sup>68</sup> Aryn Baker, "How the Taliban Thrives," *Time*, 7 September 2009, 53.

<sup>69</sup> David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice*, 79-80.

<sup>70</sup> David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice*, 55.

through SC's unequivocal message of support of sacred value themes as the basis for IO for crafting operations. Warfare's inherent dynamism provides dramatic contexts where narratives unfold in stages to achieve ideologies with promises for better futures.

Insurgent forces have effectively appropriated narrative scripts to identify their presence, interpret cause, and appeal to the people. Earning the population's support arises from observed experiences of the sacred value of peace and security, an alignment of the sacred values through words and actions, and a prolonged commitment to earn trust.

### **Recommendations for Military Operations**

The thesis of this paper is that ISAF mission effectiveness requires clearly identifying and strategically communicating universally agreed upon sacred value themes. Afghani citizens actively engaged in creating narratives of struggle demonstrate the value of appropriating the sacred values in governance and socioeconomic development. Because sacred values reach into humanity's common spirit, they draw on innate yearning to spur human pursuit of these values. Afghanis will form new identities through population-focused operations demonstrating observed experiences of the sacred value themes, resulting in a secure, sustainable environment for stability.

Research suggests three recommendations.

1. Strategically communicate an unambiguous message that five sacred value themes provide normative criteria for designing military operations to achieve governmental and socio-economic improvements in Afghanistan: *pursuit of peace and security; justice and respect for rule of law; human rights for men and women, young and old; human dignity and worth; and, freedom of expression.*

2. Second, establish strategic communication as ISAF's main effort. Promote a deeds-based diplomacy that communicates sacred values better than words: health care, education, economic opportunity, food and shelter, training rule of law and political interpretation, and other people-focused activities. IO must participate as full partners, if not lead agent, to ensure words and deeds are joined effectively to create observable experiences within the culture. Utilize Afghani oral tradition to create stories, symbols, and rituals to script Vlahos' six-chapter narrative pursuit toward new identity. Articulate a compelling ideology infused with sacred value themes. Use population-focused IO (PSYOPS, PA, CMO, and DSPD) that builds a relationship of commitment and trust through cooperative efforts with citizens that form new narratives for GoIRA, ISAF, Afghanistan, and its many tribes.

3. Third, embrace new doctrine and training for strategic communication, identification and communication of the five sacred value themes, narrative processes, and identity formation. Military operations should capitalize on narrative development and proven frameworks for identity formation. Crafted in real actions, SC articulates the universal quest to embrace the international community's sacred values. Lessons learned in current COIN operations emphasize the application of all the instruments of power through inter-agency teamwork across the full spectrum of political-military operations.

For example, in *The Accidental Guerilla*, David Kilcullen appeals to reimagining this form of new doctrine. A successful Afghani construction project partnered with citizens, yielded a narrative, and formed new identities:

This [provincial reconstruction team] project seems to be succeeding because people have used the process of the road's construction, especially the close engagement with district and tribal leaders this entails, as a framework around which to organize a full-spectrum strategy – an

approach I call “political maneuver” – to separate insurgents from the people, win local allies, connect the population to the government, build local governance capacity, modify and improve government behavior, swing local tribes that had supported the insurgency (security, governance, development, and information). The road itself matters less than the construction process, which helps focus and organize a broader security strategy.<sup>71</sup>

New doctrine and training must incorporate “affective” grasps of globalization’s destabilizing impact on ethnic, religious, national, and cultural identities. Current IO doctrine describes the information environment as consisting of three interrelated dimensions: physical, informational, and cognitive.<sup>72</sup> Sacred values drive human actions in *passionate* ways, a realm critically important in environments where religion and beliefs motivate persons. Winning future wars may rest on earning a population’s natural support through strategic communication of an efficacious ideology that human beings feel lay in the heart and soul, just barely out of the mind’s grasp.

## Conclusion

*What moral authority trumps principles of non-interference, how are changes best accomplished, and why would Afghans willingly cooperate?* Sacred value themes as enshrined in UN agreements are the moral criteria that will ultimately prove effective in evaluating ISAF efforts to improve governance and socioeconomic development in the pursuit of sustainable security in Afghanistan. As expressions of the deepest innate human capacities, sacred values appeal universally to people across time and boundaries. Humanity’s soul, heart, and mind are drawn toward their narrative pursuit. ISAF success as change-agent resides in effective strategic communication, weaving narratives in

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<sup>71</sup> David Kilcullen, *The Accidental Guerrilla*, 71.

<sup>72</sup> Joint Publication (JP) 3-13, *Information Operations*, 13 February 2006.

actions and words through IO that provides dramatic observed and experienced improvements as a result of embracing sacred value themes. If successful, Afghanistan's population will have formed its new identity by living into the noble quest for a sustainable stability.

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